'Real atrocities'

As the United States buries former President Jimmy Carter, much of the discussion about his legacy has centred on his humanitarian work and support for human rights.

It is an area where even his critics would admit he has few peers.

While many ex-presidents spend retirement enjoying the benefits of their quasi-celebrity status, Carter built houses for the poor, helped eradicate lethal diseases and spoke out about thorny political issues, including by denouncing Israel’s use of apartheid against the Palestinians.

As president from 1977 to 1981, historians say Carter also placed a rhetorical emphasis on human rights that set a new standard for other leaders around the globe.

But historians also note that Carter showed a willingness to discard human rights concerns during his presidency when faced with abuses committed by US allies in countries like South Korea and Indonesia.

For example, the military government ruling Indonesia at the time was initially concerned that Carter’s emphasis on human rights might place US military assistance in jeopardy.

Indonesia had launched an invasion of East Timor in 1975 that ultimately killed as much as 25 percent of the population and used starvation as a weapon of war.

Instead, Indonesia found in the Carter administration a firm ally that increased weapons transfers and worked to discredit reports about atrocities being committed, even as it pushed for Indonesia to release political prisoners.

“I think that, in assessing Carter’s human rights policy, there are some places where his administration did pursue a reasonably principled approach,” said Bradley Simpson, a history professor at the University of Connecticut.

“But we have to acknowledge that there were real atrocities that took place during the administration, about which they were directly aware and made a deliberate choice to continue with policies that led to enormous human suffering.”

Carter won the presidency for a single term in 1976, at a time when many voters felt that the US had been tarnished by political scandals at home and a bloody war in Vietnam abroad.

A peanut farmer and former governor from the southern state of Georgia, Carter emphasised honesty and human rights in his campaign.

Experts say that was perceived as a welcome change by voters exhausted by stories of deception at the highest levels of government, particularly under former President Richard Nixon.

The disastrous war in Vietnam, as well as revelations about US-backed coups, assassinations and other misdeeds abroad, had also emboldened Congress to push for greater foreign policy oversight and curbs on executive power.

Carter’s rhetoric seemed to align with those forces. A growing number of watchdog groups such as Amnesty International had also started to popularise the language of human rights on the world stage.

“He was the first significant global leader to formally say that our foreign policy is going to include the promotion of international human rights,” said Barbara Keys, a history professor at Durham University in the United Kingdom. “And once Carter does it, everyone has to start doing it.”

But that rhetoric had pragmatic uses as well. Foreign policy hawks saw the language of human rights as a tool that could be wielded against adversaries such as the Soviet Union in the global contest for influence and legitimacy.

“We tend to associate human rights with the left wing of the political spectrum,” said Keys. “But actually, in the US context, the use of international human rights promotion as a foreign policy tool was first used by conservatives.”

While Carter’s public persona was one of a human rights crusader, many of his key foreign policy advisers were less keen.

In response to staffers who suggested that the US cut aid to allies such as Indonesia and South Korea over their human rights records, Carter’s national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski dismissively said in an internal memo that he wanted recommendations based on “serious” policy.

The administration met what was perhaps the most serious test of its commitment to human rights in East Timor, which had sought independence, despite Indonesia’s desire to absorb the area into its own territory.

Simpson, the history professor, said that Indonesia’s near-total dependence on US weapons gave Carter substantial leverage to push for an end to Indonesia’s invasion.

Instead, the administration increased support to Indonesia’s military government, which had killed as many as one million people suspected of leftist sympathies after seizing power in 1965.

The US also worked to undermine reports on catastrophic humanitarian conditions in East Timor during Carter’s time in office.

For example, in March 1977, Australia’s former consul in East Timor, James Dunn, was invited to testify before the US Congress. He stated that Indonesia’s actions in East Timor might constitute “the most serious case of contravention of human rights facing the world at this time”.

To illustrate his point, Dunn noted that upwards of 10 percent of the population had been killed or died of starvation and preventable disease since the start of the invasion.

But the Carter administration sent foreign policy advisers to reassure Congress, emphasising that the situation in East Timor was “fairly calm” with “very few civilian casualties”. Any civilian suffering, they said, was likely the fault of left-wing Fretilin rebels who were resisting Indonesia’s invasion.

“These were flat-out lies, contradicted by every piece of available evidence that was coming across the desk of the US embassy and State Department officials,” said Simpson.

The Carter Center, a human rights nonprofit founded by the late President Carter, was not able to respond to inquiries from Al Jazeera before publication.

In South Korea, as well, historians say that Carter adopted the messaging of a military government facing human rights criticism.

In May 1980, a student-led pro-democracy uprising in the South Korean city of Gwangju was met with a brutal crackdown. In a single day, 60 people were killed and hundreds injured.

Journalist Timothy Shorrock, who has been reporting on US-South Korea relations for decades, said that the Carter administration was wary of losing a useful Cold War ally and, therefore, threw its weight behind the military government.

He explained the US supported the South Korean leadership by freeing up military resources that allowed troops to put down the uprising.

“Knowing that [military leader General Chun Doo-hwan’s] forces had murdered 60 people the day before, they still believed this uprising was a national security threat to the United States,” Shorrock said of the Carter officials.

He added that when a US aircraft carrier was sent to the region, some protesters convinced of US rhetoric on democracy and human rights believed that the US was coming to intervene on their behalf.

Instead, the carrier had been deployed to bolster the US military presence so that South Korean troops at the demilitarised zone with North Korea could be reassigned to put down the uprising.

Shorrock says that contingency plans even included the possible use of US forces if the unrest in Gwangju spread further.

While there is no universally accepted death toll for the uprising, the official government figure is that more than 160 people perished. Some academic sources put the death toll at more than 1,000.

Asked by a reporter if his actions had been at odds with his professed commitment to human rights, Carter said that there was “no incompatibility”.

He asserted that the US was helping South Korea maintain its national security against a threat of “communist subversion”, mirroring the rhetoric of the country’s military leadership.

It was the kind of rhetoric that South Korean leaders had long used to justify repressive and antidemocratic measures.

When South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol declared martial law in December 2024 in the name of combating “antistate forces”, many drew parallels to the traumatic events of Gwangju.

“What he was saying at the time was what General Chun Doo-hwan was saying, characterising this as a communist uprising, which it was not,” said Shorrock. “He never apologised for that.”